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**PUBLIC CONTROVERSIES OVER ZYGMUNT WIELOPOLSKI'S
VOLUNTARY SERVICE IN THE TSARIST ARMY (1849-1855)
DURING THE CONGRESS KINGDOM OF POLAND**

The article raises the issue of military service of Count Zygmunt Wielopolski (1833-1902),¹ the eldest son of Margrave Aleksander Wielopolski (1803-1877),² the Entailer of Chroberz and supporter of the agreement between Polish elites and the Russian Tsar. At the beginning of the 1850s this issue triggered heated discussions among the elites of the Kingdom of Poland on the limits of cooperation between representatives of the Polish nobility, “the former political nation” of the pre-partitioned Republic and the Russian “invading government”, suppressor of the recent November Uprising.

It should be underlined at the outset that the case of Count Zygmunt Wielopolski's voluntary entering into the tsarist army was not altogether unprecedented in Polish society. However, his case triggered widespread public attention in the Kingdom owing to highly controversial political calculations of Count Zygmunt's father, Margrave Aleksander. The latter hoped, in fact, that this gesture of his will win the partitioning tsarist authorities and bend them to negotiate on the restoration of the autonomy for the Congress Kingdom of Poland, which was disestablished as part of repressions for

¹ Zygmunt Wielopolski (1803-1877), the Entailer of Chroberz, acting as the president of Warsaw from 08/1862-09/1863; the director of the Government Committee for Religious Affairs and Public Enlightenment in 1863; a counsel of the Central Committee of Land Credit Society in years 1876-1900; administrator of Łowicz Duchy; active in addressing and sending memorials to the Tsar. See: M. Czajka, M. Kamler, W. Sienkiewicz, *Leksykon Historii Polski*, Warsaw 1995, p. 794.

² Aleksander Wielopolski (1803-1877), the Entailer of Chroberz; a member of the Polish diet and on diplomatic mission to London in 1830. The director of the Government Committee for Religious Affairs and Public Enlightenment in 1861; in April that year – the director of the Justice Commission and in 1862 – head of the civil government. The agreement with the Tsar allowed him to carry out social reforms (like imposing rents on peasants, the reform of education system, equal rights for Jews, the introduction of the county and gubernatorial government) which did not convince the Polish public. Accused of forcible conscription into the Russian army, he unwillingly led to a premature Polish uprising; against this backdrop he fell from the Tsar's favour and resigned in September 1863. He thereafter left for Drezno where he died. *Ilustrowana Encyklopedia Trzaski, Everta i Michalskiego*, vol. 10, ed. S. Lam, Warsaw 1926, p. 239.

the “rebellion of 1830”. Determination with which he promoted the concept of historic compromise between the Poles and the Tsar was fuelled by his early experience gained from participating in the November Uprising and the shock he went through in 1846 when the Galician peasants revolted against Polish landed gentry.

At the time of the independence uprising, the Margrave was on a diplomatic mission in London on the command of the insurgent Polish government. His aim was to obtain the English government’s support for the idea of restoring Polish independence. His mission failed which, according to Andrzej Szwarz, “convinced him that it was impossible to count on the help from the West which had no serious interests in the Central and Eastern Europe and feared any conflict with the powerful Russia”.³ What is more, the Margrave’s participating in the Uprising forced him to flee abroad. However, with the help of influential parents-in-laws he managed to obtain the Russian authorities’ permission to return to the Kingdom.⁴ The precipitous return of the Entailer of Chroberz was caused by his concern that at that time the Tsar adopted a decision to sequester the estates of those landowners engaged in the Uprising who were staying abroad. In September 1832 Aleksander Wielopolski received a permission to inhabit his ancestral estates and in April 1834 he pledged an oath of allegiance to the Tsar Nicholas I.⁵

A demonstrative abandon of the idea of armed struggle for independence by the elites was not an incidental phenomenon. This stance could be observed within many gentry circles which argued that “the way of conspiracy should be replaced by »utilitarian work«, i.e. the work for the country’s development”,⁶ in terms of economy and education, focusing on maintaining a position of influence in a modernizing society of the Kingdom. The nobility’s switch from the conspiracy to the organic work was highly influenced by the events of 1846 i.e. a failed uprising and a bloody Galician peasant revolt. These revealed clashes between the interests of landed gentry and the broad masses of society that supported the idea of insurrection in exchange for profound social transformation. Another shock was the fact that the Habsburg monarchy, whose actual *raison d’être* provided feudal elites, seeking to suppress the preparations

³ A. Szwarz, *Sąd nad Aleksandrem Wielopolskim*, [in:] *Rok 1863*, ed. W. Caban, Kielce 1993, p. 42.

⁴ A widespread public condemnation was drawn after some light was shed on the fact that the Entailer of Chroberz was protected in the court by his parents-in-law, Count Michał Potocki and Ludwika nee Ostrowska. Since 1832 the Margrave had been the spouse of their younger daughter Paulina (incidentally, previously in April 1826 he married the elder sister, Teresa, who died during his mission in London while giving birth to their daughter in February 1831; the baby died a month later as well). J. Kita, *Tomasz Potocki (1809-1861). Ewolucja postaw ziemianina polskiego*, Łódź 2007, pp. 109-112.

⁵ Z. Małecki, *Reformy gospodarcze margrabiego Aleksandra Wielopolskiego*, [in:] *Aktywność gospodarcza ziemiaństwa w Polsce w XVIII-XX wieku*, eds. W. Caban and M. B. Markowski, Kielce 1993, p. 78.

⁶ W. Caban, *Ziemiaństwo Królestwa Polskiego wobec ruchu niepodległościowego w latach 1833-1856*, [in:] *Ziemiaństwo a ruchy niepodległościowe w Polsce XIX-XX wieku*, eds. W. Caban and M. B. Markowski, Kielce 1994, p. 13.

for the insurrection, “employed peasants’ sythes [...] and a consent to murder the landlords was in fact inconceivable for the whole stratum of wealthy gentry”.⁷

According to the Margrave’s affiliated conservative politician, Paweł Popiel, the policy pursued by Vienna made Aleksander Wielopolski, “resentful [...] and changed his thinking into: where to look for a revenge? Only in Russia. And since that moment, having spoken with rigidity, for which he was renowned, that he was bound to seek justice in the Tsar Nicolas he dreamt of Poland’s alliance with Russia”.⁸ In April 1846 he developed a famous and anonymously published *Lettre d’un gentilhomme polonais sur les massacres de gallicie adressée au prince Metternich à l’occasion de sa dépêche circulaire du 7 mars 1846* (better known under the abbreviated title *Letter of a Polish nobleman to Prince Metternich*).⁹

In its light, Polish landed gentry should look for the backup in the tsarist autocracy that respects the privileges of the nobility and their primacy of political and social nature in the Russian Empire regardless of ethnic origin. Evidence of this were successful proceedings in foreign policy (winning the wars and territorial gains) of the suppressor of the November Uprising – Tsar Nicolas I. All these were to testify to the power of the Tsars’ state – the state monarchy of nobles. According to Aleksander Wielopolski all of these facts suggested the need for the Polish landed gentry to adopt the attitude of loyalty towards the Romanovs as the Russian emperors and at the same time Polish kings. A practical dimension of this stance would be to demonstratively support the work to strengthen the power of the tsarist empire. The model was provided by German and Swedish landowners from the the Baltic Sea provinces. The intelligentsia from the Kingdom of Poland, understood by him as gentry and representatives of liberal professions (partly of the noble background) should support the process of colonisation and unification of the lands conquered during the rule of Nicolas I and the endless Siberia. Aleksander Wielopolski claimed that all these actions would not have anything to do with the blind submission, but they would prove the Polish nobility’s empowerment in the context of the imperial Russia’s elite: “until now we belonged to you, as slaves: on the strength victories and terror of others [...] we shall return to you as free people”.¹⁰ Following the desideratum of organic work Polish intelligentsia-gentry could act legally for modernisation of the country within administration and economy. This postulate was hiding a veiled remark that owing to the support that Polish nobility would give to a historic compromise with the Tsar, the nation would remain likely to survive under repression.¹¹

⁷ J. Kita, *Arystokraci Królestwa Polskiego w carskich mundurach – wybrane przykłady*, [in:] *Między irredentą a kolaboracją. Postawy społeczeństwa polskiego w latach niewoli – “W obcym mundurze”*, eds. L. Michalska-Bracha i M. Korybut-Marciniak, Warsaw 2013, p. 119.

⁸ *Pamiętniki Pawła Popiela (1807-1892)*, Cracow 1927, p. 102.

⁹ H. Lisicki, *Aleksander Wielopolski 1803-1877*, vol. 1, Cracow 1878, pp. 71-72.

¹⁰ A. Żor, *Ropucha. Studium odrzucenia*, Toruń 2005, p. 406.

¹¹ R. R. Ludwikowski, *Główne nurty polskiej myśli politycznej 1815-1890*, Warsaw 1982, pp. 97-98.

Having been identified by the Polish public as the author of this brochure, the Margrave had to face outrage and criticism. Polish public was not prepared for the vision of an agreement with the occupant as an alternative to conspiracy for independence or revolutionary socio-political changes, proposed by the radicals. In the foreign press and in brochures issued as a response to *Letter of a Polish nobleman...*, he was accused of being ignorant of social relations in the country, of Non-Christian sense of revenge and fear of the masses. The Margrave himself did not admit to have written the brochure in view of a hateful reaction of his fellow countrymen in the Kingdom of Poland, in other parts of partitioned Poland and abroad. Only a small group of people who openly collaborated with the Russian occupant supported the thesis that were presented in *Letter of a Polish nobleman...*, which sealed his discreditation in the eyes of generally patriotically minded Polish public.¹²

The brochure case had an impact on the formation of a negative stereotype of Wielopolski as a renegade, prone to servility towards the partitioning power. The high-profile court cases of Margrave Aleksander over entailed estates, which took place in the twenties and thirties of the nineteenth century, had already led to ranking him among litigants and reactionaries with the manners of proud magnates, unable to understand the need of compromise during a public discours.¹³ The above mentioned issues brought him disapproval of the press and public opinion. The more that he consistently acted in accordance with his political views, which were considered controversial, as if in line with his ancestral heraldic motto “*Franca non flectas*” (“Break rather than bend”).

The stereotype of a stubborn dogmatist convinced of infallibility of his vision of the agreement with the Tsar was to be confirmed by his public actions in the 1850s. This was proved by his frequent visits to the Russian governor of the Kingdom, the Field Marshal and Prince of Warsaw Iwan Paskiewicz; then, by liaising with tsarist bureaucrats and most of all, due to the case of a voluntary military service of his son. It is rather characteristic that in the mid-1800s many members of aristocratic elites and landed gentry did not shun a career in the military or as officials of the imperial Russia. Andrzej Zdrada, when assessing the scale of the phenomenon, pointed out that “these circles had no qualms about entering the service, and it must be said that a degree of conformism was high”.¹⁴

A voluntary service of Poles in the tsarist army, as the title of the paper suggests, was often due to economic reasons (free education and financial stability), to family traditions and political calculations. In the latter case, some country gentlemen were driven by patriotic belief that in this way it would be possible to do something good to the country, if it came to its restoration. Others were consciously acting out of their

¹² M. Jaskólski, *Kaduceus Polski. Myśl polityczna konserwatystów krakowskich 1866-1934*, Cracow 1990, pp. 75-77.

¹³ J. Grabiec-Dąbrowski, *Ostatni szlachcic. Aleksander Wielopolski Margrabia Gonzaga Myszkowski na tle dziejów*, vol. 1, Warsaw 1924, p. 95.

¹⁴ J. Zdrada, *Historia Polski 1795-1914*, Warsaw 2005, pp. 296-297.

servility to the partitioning state.¹⁵ Regardless of the nature of these reasons, they all gave an incentive to take some effort, especially on the part of the less affluent country gentry without a title of nobility. Among them, many were those who did not have their own estates or they were in a difficult economic situation.¹⁶ Wiesław Caban, when examining the attitudes of this group, pointed out that for them to serve in the army of the partitioning state was almost like to defend themselves against the pauperisation and in extreme cases, against declassament. Determined by this threat, they sought employment in “a good cavalry regiment at a very high protection”.¹⁷

Similar attempts were undertaken by aristocracy which, however, raised a lot of controversies amidst the Polish public. The most implacable in their criticism of this phenomenon was the Polish press in exile, directly alleging the treason of national interests. Public pressure made the landed gentry elite feel constrained to explain their “dressing in a tsarist army uniform”, by the pressure from the highest political authorities, i.e. “he wish made by the Tsar Nicolas or by the Prince of Warsaw Iwan Paskiewicz”.¹⁸ Information of this nature were deliberately distributed in the Kingdom in order to alleviate condemnation from fellow countrymen. As if confirming the veracity of claims regarding this issue made by the governors of the Russian state, Maria Górska recorded what follows: “they necessarily required that the noble sons served in the military in St. Petersburg. There was no commandment to do it except that the wrath of our Emperor would fall upon everyone who would restrain from that. Thus the military service in the Imperial Guard was done equally by Prince Roman Sanguszko, Count and Entailer Tomasz Zamoyski, Count Wiktor Starzeński, Count Waldemar Jezierski and by Zygmunt Wielopolski, the Margrave’s son”.¹⁹

This passage, reflecting the political atmosphere in Russia during the reign of Nicolas I, did not invalidate the opinion of contemporary observers and historians that many decisions made by aristocrats on voluntary military service were a matter of strategic moves, designed to preserve the current state of ownership and help establish valuable contacts with influential tsarist dignitaries.²⁰ For instance, Prince Roman Sanguszko had his ownership rights to the family seat in Sławuta in Volhynia confirmed “upon the adoption of Russian serfdom and voluntary joining the tsarist army. He was discharged from army for health reasons, but was still working for a few years in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies as a military attache at the Russian Embassy in Naples”.²¹

¹⁵ T. Radziwonowicz, *Polacy w armii rosyjskiej 1874-1914*, “Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości”, vol. 30, 1988, pp. 205-206.

¹⁶ T. Osiński, *Urzednicy administracji rządowej obwodu (powiatu) zamojskiego w latach 1816-1866. Charakterystyka grupy*, [in:] *Dzieje biurokracji na ziemiach polskich*, eds. A. Górska, I. Łucia and D. Magiera, vol. 1, Lublin 2008, pp. 210-224.

¹⁷ W. Caban, *Służba rekrutów z Królestwa Polskiego w armii carskiej w latach 1831-1873*, Warsaw 2001, p. 39.

¹⁸ J. Kita, *Arystokracja*, p. 120.

¹⁹ M. Górska z Łubieńskich, *Gdybym mniej kochała. Dziennik lat 1889-1895*, Warsaw 1996, p. 56.

²⁰ P. Stawecki, *Rodowód i struktura społeczna korpusu oficerskiego Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, “Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości”, vol. 21, 1981, p. 232.

²¹ J. Jakubowicz, *Sagi rodów polskich*, Lublin 2001, p. 304.

In view of threats to their material status, the aristocracy used to accept slogans launched by egalitarian, liberal and democratic movements of the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century. The turning point was the above mentioned Galician slaughter of 1846 and the wave of revolutionary movements in 1848 during the Spring of Nations. The Tsar waiting for the Empress in Michałowice, located on the borderland of the Congress Kingdom of Poland and Galicia region, was claimed to have convoked local peasant landowners, so was he impressed by the word of an imminent uprising. He forbade them to engage in any excesses either arbitrary or against the nobility, as both of them would be curbed with strict measures.²²

However, in public opinion, the case of Zygmunt Wielopolski, which which will be presented further on in this article, clearly stood out when compared with other nobles, as it was considered not as a manifestation of ancestral interests but a political demonstration. The idea of military service of the young Count appeared in spring of 1849. His father, seeing his interest in military, hired a retired artilleryman who honed Zygmunt in swordsmanship and approached him the realities of military service; the Margrave also bought him a Cossack horse.²³

During that time Aleksander Wielopolski had a conversation with Baron Meyendorff, who claimed that he could obtain for the Margrave's son an assignment to "a good regiment" in the tsarist army through the Governor-General of the Kingdom of Poland, I. Paskiewicz, whom the Margave knew well, for his part.²⁴ According to the Baron, that would open the way to a brilliant military career for Zugmunt. The Margrave depicted the results of these discussions to his wife, Countess Paulina. The later was opposed to her husband's plans as she feared for her son's life. She remembered well the risks posed by military service, taking into consideration the example of her brother Count Potocki who was seriously wounded during the November Uprising and suffered from a permanent health detriment. She knew from autopsy that the Russian army did not moulder in the barracks, but participated in military operations in the Caucasus or like for example in a recent expedition to Hungary.²⁵ She was convinced that Zygmunt should attend lectures in philosophy at the University of Wroclaw. However, the husband was adamant and started to apply for a patronage to I Paskiewicz for admitting his son to the tsarist army. Margrave Aleksander obscured the nature of these plans before his friends saying that he fret for his son not to indulge in the pastimes of so called "golden youth". However, a close friend of the Margrave, P. Popiel saw through his intentions, seeing them as calculations and political views; their "symptom was his son Zygmunt's military service in the Russian army".²⁶

²² A. M. Skałkowski, *Aleksander Wielopolski (1803-1877) w świetle archiwów rodzinnych*, vol. 2, Poznań 1947, p. 109.

²³ Archiwum Państwowe in Kielce (further: APK), Archiwum Ordynacji Myszkowskiej (further: AOM), sig. 1450, p. 55; ibidem, sig. 232, p. 23.

²⁴ Z. Stankiewicz, *Dzieje wielkości i upadku Aleksandra Wielopolskiego*, Warsaw 1964, p. 84.

²⁵ A. M. Skałkowski, *Aleksander*, vol. 3, p. 134; W. Staniszewski, *Pamiętniki więźnia stanu i zesłańca*, Warsaw 1994, pp. 233-248.

²⁶ *Pamiętniki*, p. 149.

The project of his son's military service was aimed at approaching Aleksander Wielopolski to the decision making circles of the Empire in order to gain their representatives to the concept of modernisation of the Kingdom of Poland, however vague this idea was outlined in his mind at that time. Prominent public figures judging that Zygmunt's case involved the aforementioned political plans, indicated that the Margrave wanted to reorganize the country "with help of the Russian power as there wasn't any other" and that "essential interests of our nation can be reconciled with the interests of the Russian nation".²⁷ This question was related to another issue, i.e. Aleksander Wielopolski's intent to strengthen his public position in the Kingdom of Poland through establishing negotiations with the decision makers in the empire, which would allow him to assume the role of a representative of affluent spheres.²⁸

The opportunity to execute these plans came up in 1850 together with the Jubilee of a half-a-century long national service of the Prince and General-Governor I. Paskiewicz, which fell in the same year. In January that year the Margrave gained an audience with him, asking for guiding his son in military career. It is then that the Entailer of Chroberz presented his son's advantages as a handsome young man who dreams of serving as an officer in the tsarist army.²⁹ The Prince acceded; on his part the Margrave pledged to officially introduce his son to the Governor at the time of the celebration of the aforementioned jubilee falling in October 1850. On 23 October Aleksander and Zygmunt had the honour of an audience with the Prince and General-Governor. During the audience the Margrave declared to I. Paskiewicz that he had come so that the Governor could fulfill the promise of taking the Margrave's son under his wing. Meanwhile he implied that he wanted for Zygmunt to enter into the military at the time of the Prince's jubilee. However, due to his son's health problems and his poor knowledge of Russian, the Margrave asked the Governor to postpone the Count's engagement until the summer of 1851. I. Paskiewicz, on his part, confirmed his favour, declaring even that he would introduce Wielopolski junior to the Emperor himself. At the same occasion he promised to issue a passport so that Zygmunt could strengthen his physical condition bathing in the sea in Italy and France.³⁰

After the audience the Margrave betook himself and his son to the society salon of a high-profile economist and botanist Władysław Łuszczewski (a then director of the Department of Industry and Crafts in the the Home Affairs Commission). Count Zygmunt put his best foot forward there. He attracted attention of a group of officers who underlined that his external attributes were an asset for service in the Russian Imperial Guard. One of them, an adjutant to the Tsar – general Adam Rzewuski³¹

²⁷ Ibidem, p. 151; *Pamiętniki ks. Zygmunta Szczęsnego Felińskiego arcybiskupa warszawskiego*, vol. 2: 1851-1883, Cracow 1897, p. 171.

²⁸ APK, AOM, sig. 215, p. 34.

²⁹ A. M. Skałkowski, *Aleksander*, vol. 2, p. 142. Cf.: APK, AOM, sig. 213, pp. 78-98.

³⁰ The General-Governor was supposed to have told Jacek Jezierski that he intended to present both Wielopolskis to the Tsar Nicolas I. APK, AOM, sig. 232, p. 215.

³¹ Adam Rzewuski (1801-1888), fighting in the Russian army in years 1825-1865; participated in the pacification of the 1830 and 1863 Uprisings; a general since 1843; in 1863 the Commander

offered to introduce Zygmunt to the emperor. At the same time he expressed a wish to take him to the headquarters of his Caucasus corps as his adjutant.³²

The Margrave's demarches on his son's military service became well-known and extensively commented in society salons in Warsaw. Aleksander was believed to claim that "the little Zygmunt is popular wherever he goes and though the step we had taken is well-known in the entire city, I haven't noticed him make an unfavourable impression".³³ However, this observation came from the initial period of their stay in the capital. Over time, they began to meet with the manifestations of social exclusion.³⁴ This was due to the fact that numerous Polish citizens restrained from participating in the jubilee of I. Paskiewicz since the public opinion kept reminding about impropriety of assisting at these events. It was constantly recalled that the General-Governor was the suppressor of the November Uprising. Even the Margrave's next of kin, his brother-in-law Count T. Potocki did not decide to demonstrate his loyalty, using different considerations as a pretext. Whereas this part of the bourgeois-landowning elites who did take part cared to show their aloofness and official manners towards the tsarist bureaucrats. Thus all cases of ostentatious loyalty were carefully recorded by the public opinion of the Kingdom of Poland and understood as servility towards the partitioning state.³⁵

As a consequence, the case of a voluntary military service of Wielopolski's son in the Russian army caused an understood sensation and general stirring. The prevailing comments were that the Margrave's demarche was in fact an indirect demonstration of his conciliatory views. It was recalled that his loyalty to the Tsar had already been revealed by his anonymous *Letter of a Polish nobleman...*; and it was claimed that "the theory which he had expressed earlier was implemented by his recent step of allowing his eldest son, a would be heir of the Margrave's estates, enter the Russian army as a volunteer".³⁶ It was also pointed out by historians that his decision on Zygmunt's service was politically motivated. W. Caban claimed that "a part of landed gentry of the Kingdom of Poland [...] perceived Russia as a guarantor of feudal system Sending their sons to the cadet corps in St. Petersburg was like a signal of readiness for an agreement with the Tsar".³⁷ Another scholar, Janina Rusin stated that "However many Poles served in the tsarist army [...] in most cases, the military service was their only source of income. Wielopolski's son did not need to earn for his living, therefore his sending to the Russian army was recognised as servility and a desire to pursue a career at all costs. This fact was perceived as the Margrave's subservient gesture even by the Russians themselves".³⁸

of Kiev Military Region. S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Rzewuski (1801-1888)*, [in:] *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. 34, Warsaw 1992, p. 99.

³² H. Lisicki, *Aleksander Wielopolski*, vol. 1, p. 95.

³³ APK, AOM, sig. 234, p. 30.

³⁴ A. M. Skałkowski, *Aleksander*, vol. 2, p. 146.

³⁵ W. Karpiński, *Polska a Rosja. Z dziejów słowiańskiego sporu*, Warsaw 1994, pp. 28-29.

³⁶ J. Grabcieć-Dąbrowski, *Ostatni*, vol. 1, pp. 86-90.

³⁷ W. Caban, *W służbie imperium czy ofiary imperium?*, [in:] *Powstanie styczniowe. Polacy i Rosjanie w XIX wieku*, eds. L. Michalska-Bracha, S. Wiech, J. Legieć, Kielce 2011, p. 265.

³⁸ J. Rusin, *Aleksander Wielopolski. Bohater trudnej legendy*, Rzeszów 1998, p. 38.

Over time, it turned out that the favouring gestures towards the Wielopolskis “during the introduction at the Prince-Governor”, were part of a political intrigue of the latter. The Entailer and his son were used by him to prove the Tsar that the political situation in the Kingdom of Poland remained stable under his governing rule; which was to be exemplified by the elites’ loyalty. I. Paskiewicz did not fulfil his promise to introduce Zygmunt to the Tsar when the Emperor visited Warsaw during the governor’s jubilee. The tsarist notables from the capital seemed to make it impossible for the Entailer to have another audience with the Governor of the Kingdom, despite urgent insistence of Wielopolski.³⁹ What is more, in the spring of 1851 the Margrave was explicitly condemned by some members of aristocracy and landed gentry. The issue of his efforts to acquire protection of the very Governor of the Kingdom became a public secret. Due to patriotically minded general public, and partly feeling opposed to the actions taken by the Entailer of Chroberz, the nobles preferred to keep their distance from him. These acts of the elite did not escape his attention as he noted: “we were not invited for dinner even once”.⁴⁰ He left the capital in an atmosphere of social isolation, clearly unhappy with the effects of the whole operation. Zygmunt, flattered by the attention he received from bureaucrats and officers was leaving in a different frame of mind. What is more, unlike his father, he was negligent of the reluctance of his fellow countrymen. This resulted from his lordly contempt for public opinion and willingness to provoke it by intentional behaviour that was contrary to the general sense of social propriety. This is probably why, despite general hostility, he took part in a ball in the town hall, ostensibly enjoying himself, which gave rise to the taunts of careful observers.⁴¹

Young Wielopolski’s case took off the ground in July 1851. This is what the Margrave understood by the issuance of a passport for Zygmunt. A month later the father and son went to Paris. The first step of the journey, however, was Cracow where the Margrave’s friend, Count Roman Załuski informed the Entailer of Chroberz on the Parisian leading specialists of the upper respiratory tract diseases. Whereas another close friend of the Margrave, P. Meyendorff gave him a letter of recommendation to Paweł Kisielew, the Russian envoy in Brussels, asking for any assistance they needed.

Their stay abroad left the Margrave in shock as he was confronted at first hand with his son’s attitude to life, which the father felt was scandalous. He noticed the first symptoms of it when they participated in the I. Paskiewicz’s jubilee in Warsaw; in contrast to a rather introverted Aleksander, Zygmunt was seeking to indulge himself in entertainment and balls. His son’s light-heartedness was further confirmed in their escapade to the Western Europe. Heartbroken, the Margrave wrote to his wife: “as it was there, so is here; the most engaging for him was to find the best restaurant

³⁹ A. M. Skalkowski when analysing the Margrave’s correspondence proved that the bureaucrats “feared some complications so it was postponed until some time”. A. M. Skalkowski, *Aleksander*, vol. 2, p. 146.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

and especially the cigars”.⁴² His son’s difficult character was also manifested by mood swings, sudden fits of anger caused by trivial reasons, interspersed with apathy and intellectual laziness.⁴³ Having consulted with the Parisian medical doctor, Dr. Louis, he sent his son to the resort in Dieppe.⁴⁴ Zygmunt’s disgraceful behaviour made them come back to the country in mid-October 1851. Surprisingly enough, while Aleksander left for Chroberz intending to catch up with the supervision of his entailed estate, he allowed his son to go to Warsaw to scandalize the local opinion with his riotous lifestyle. The latter, with an innate straightness claimed to be financed by his father for another trip to Paris.⁴⁵

The Margrave, regaining his determination and under pressure from his brother-in-law had to admit that a military service would be beneficial for good morals of Wielopolski Junior. Wielopolski’s relation advised him to incorporate his son in the dragoon regiment, where the junior would have to spend a lot of time on the barrack square, practising drills.⁴⁶ The army was supposed to take over the functions of educator for Zygmunt. It must be remembered that the person concerned was an 18-year-old.⁴⁷ It is difficult to expect that years of parental neglect will be levelled by a stay in the ranks of the Russian army. Let us remember for one thing that the tsarist officers were known for their insubordination, litigiousness and cavalry lifestyle, especially after hours of orderly service in the barracks. Drinking sessions, visits to restaurants in the company of women with severely tainted reputation or scandalous love conquests (frequently of married women) ending in scandals (and even duels), all this illustrated the model of Russian social life of the officer corps. There can be added as well spending time on card games, including high roller games and general disregard for money. All in all, these factors were hardly convincing as to the healing effect of barracks on the morals of the golden youth.⁴⁸ Nevertheless Aleksander was highly motivated seeing it as the only remedy for his son. This is what he wrote in one of the letters to his brother-in-law: “it is also essential for Zygmunt for moral reasons to seriously pursue a chosen career [...] it can develop his spirit and end all those improprieties which come from hollowness and indolence”.⁴⁹

At the turn of 1851-1852 young Wielopolski using his father’s plans concerning his service in the army, pretended to be interested in military service so as to be in a position to demand his salary increase.⁵⁰ This well-known frequenter of society salons

⁴² Ibidem, p. 148.

⁴³ APK, AOM, sig. 216, p. 35.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, sig. 42, pp. 29-32; ibidem, sig. 232, p. 456.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, sig. 145, p. 23.

⁴⁶ Ibidem, sig. 1435, pp. 35-38.

⁴⁷ Their picture was immortalised e.g. by S. Żeromski, *Uroda życia*, Warsaw 1990, pp. 148-150.

⁴⁸ W. Caban points out that “lieutenants, and second lieutenants after receiving pay once a quarter squandered it rather quickly as they had nothing to do in the barracks but drink vodka and practise various forms of gambling”. W. Caban, *Slużba*, p. 43.

⁴⁹ APK, AOM, sig. 226, pp. 28-51.

⁵⁰ The father paid him out 500 zloty thalers a month (supposing that this should cover all his expenditures along with the costs of maintaining an apartment in Warsaw); but the son demanded 1200 zloty thalers. Ibidem, sig. 232, p. 78.

elaborated before his father's eyes the vision of broad contacts which he would make with the tsarist officials and representatives of the army. Aleksander seemed to believe his son since he wrote to his wife that supposedly "Mr Muchanoff⁵¹ took a strong liking of him; the love, which I want to benefit from".⁵² The Count was also supposed to make new relations allowing him to obtain passport documents for the Margrave which that one needed for his frequent travels in Europe. It was with some anxiety that the Margrave learnt the word from Zygmunt that the officers were to disclose before him the alleged plans of the Tsar himself relating to his son's person. He was said to be referred to the Imperial Guard regiment in St. Petersburg or to be sent as an adjutant to one of the corpses in the Caucasus. The latter prospect was rather worrying since for many years there has been ongoing Chechen uprising there, under the command of Shamil.⁵³

In January 1852 Aleksander promised to transfer Zygmunt 1500 thalers. However, he subordinated this pay out to a number of conditions: first, the junior had to procure an audience with the governor and ask for the opportunity to start his military service yet this year, after Easter.⁵⁴ What is more, he was to declare in front of I. Paskiewicz that he wanted to do his service as a junker in one of the provincial garrisons, in close proximity of the ancestral grounds, declining an offer to serve in the Imperial Guard or in the Caucasus. The above move was to prove Aleksander's political calculations. The son's military service in the inland Russia would pass unnoticed, losing its purpose of demonstrating loyalty towards the Tsar-King of Poland by representatives of an excellent historical lineage bearing a well-recognised name. Whereas his son's stay in the Kingdom of Poland would signal that the Margrave wanted to maintain dialogue with the tsarist authorities.

The case of Count Zygmunt's military service took on a new dimension, because of the social scandal that he was involved in. In March 1852, the uncles – Counts Henryk and Władysław Potocki, reported that they were witnesses to a discredit of Wielopolski junior in one of the city's society salons. With all theatrical manners he delighted in, this 19-year-old youth appeared in the society in a company of then 32-year old princess Zenaida Lubomirska.⁵⁵ This case became the object of gossip in the hostile environment of aristocracy as Zygmunt's partner was not only older than he but also married for 15 years to Prince Kazimierz. In the light of contemporary

⁵¹ Paweł Aleksandrowicz Muchanow (1798-1871). An employee of the Warsaw School District Board of Trustees since 1849; a superintendent since 1851; a director of the Government Committee for Internal and Religious Affairs in years 1856-1861; then a member of the Russian State Council. Z. Stankiewicz, *Dzieje*, passim.

⁵² A. M. Skąłowski, *Aleksander*, vol. 2, p. 151.

⁵³ Ch. King, *Widmo wolności. Historia Kaukazu*, Cracow 2010, pp. 12-32.

⁵⁴ *Margrabia Aleksander Wielopolski. Jego życie i działalność polityczna*, Warsaw 1912, p. 10.

⁵⁵ Zeinada nee Hołyńska Princess Lubomirska (1820-1893), daughter of Michał, the lieutenant of the tsarist army and the marshal of the Mahileu nobility and a Russian Countess – Elżbieta nee Tołstoj. Since 1837 she was the wife of Prince Kazimierz Lubomirski who held the position of a Vice President of the Warsaw Society of Support for Musical Artists in years 1852-1858. M. Szenic, *Maria Kalergis*, Warsaw 1965, p. 398.

social norms, their attitude was reprehensible, considered as evidence of moral licentiousness.

The case required immediate attention because it was doing dreadful harm to the good name of Wielopolski family and their relatives, Potocki and Ostrowski families. The scandal could result in challenging Zygmunt to a duel by the cuckold husband. And that could have a tragic end, which would only increase the disgraceful situation. During Easter time when Chrzastow estate was housing Potocki and Wielkopolski families, the junior was severely reprimanded by his father and uncle – Count Tomasz.⁵⁶ The family reunion ended up with a decision that the only way to avoid scandal was to accelerate the project of Zygmunt's military service. Having consulted Meyendorffem, Aleksander took a trip to Warsaw with Zygmunt. On 2nd May he was auditioned with I. Paskiewicz.⁵⁷ The Governor gave them a warm welcome and implied that the Tsar Nicholas I had made a personal wish for "the giant" Zygmunt to take his military service in the Imperial Guard, in the capital of the Empire.⁵⁸ This perspective totally did not follow the line of the Margrave's plans; therefore he asked the governor for another audience, but this time in private settings. The latter agreed to receive him and even invited him for dinner which expressed a certain degree of attention on the part of the Field-Marshal towards Aleksander Wielkopolski. The course of the informal meeting was reported by Wielopolski in a letter to his wife.

In its light, I. Paskiewicz was believed to say that the Entailer of Chrobrze "couldn't have confided the matters to a better care than his and that his noble acting endeared him and that he would do anything in his might so that our son would stay under his commend. He advised me himself to immediately submit a doctor's examination report that a cold climate is not advisable for Zygmunt's lungs, along with a letter from us both which he could show the Tsar and support himself".⁵⁹ Aleksander, trying to establish this thought, stated that he would like to revisit the Governor with his son in the evening the same day. Wielopolski Junior was to give his acknowledgement for the Governor's care himself. The purpose of this visit was also to make the Junior realise that there is no turning back from military service, that his life of a loafer comes to an end; and that he must finalize his scandalous affair with Z. Lubomirska.⁶⁰ It was also in this context that Wielopolski father spoke to the corps commander standing in Lubelskie region, general Teodore Paniutyn. The officer was of an opinion that a military service "will end the falsehood on the part of a known person [*i.e. Lubomirska – M. N.*]"⁶¹

⁵⁶ APK, AOM, sig. 232, p. 453.

⁵⁷ Ibidem, sig. 1450, p. 54.

⁵⁸ Ibidem, sig. 1450, p. 55.

⁵⁹ A. M. Skalkowski, *Aleksander*, vol. 2, p. 152.

⁶⁰ Hence a passage in a letter to his wife, saying that: "in order to preserve it all, not only with the Prince but also in Zygmunt's mind, I asked the Prince for a favour to bring him yet that evening". The Margrave's intention to quickly close the case can be reflected by the fact that the very next day he arrived to the governor with the indicated letter which was to be handed in to the Tsar. APK, AOM, sig. 214, p. 45.

⁶¹ A. M. Skalkowski, *Aleksander*, vol. 2, p. 153.

On 13 May 1852 Wielopolski and his son had the last audience with the Governor. During that audience I. Paskiewicz promised to describe the young Wielopolski “to the Tsar as a ready soldier”.⁶²

Meantime, Count Zygmunt passed his exam for a junker,⁶³ which allowed him to officially start the service on 22 May 1852. He was assigned as a second lieutenant to the Smolensk Lancers Regiment of Mikołaj Aleksandrowicz, stationed in Lublin. His father negotiated for him to act as an adjutant to the commander. This unit was quite specific as it was largely recruited from the Poles; out of six squadrons five were commanded by the Count’s countrymen.⁶⁴

It might seem that the first stage of the Margrave’s actions had been fulfilled and that it was a very moment to expect some confidential maneuvers on the part of the tsarist authorities aimed at entering into political negotiations with Wielopolski on the agreement formula and measures to reconstruct the autonomy from 1815. However, the reality thwarted Aleksander Wielopolski’s plans. First of all, Polish public opinion learnt with caution, if not with condemnation the fact that Zygmunt took up voluntary service in the army of the partitioning state.⁶⁵ His mother seemed to explain to her friends that it was a question of necessity, dictated by educational reasons and a need to end the scandalous relationship with Z. Lubomirska.⁶⁶ She completely downplayed, or maybe she did not want to see a much more embarrassing element of her son’s military service, i.e. the accusation of servility towards the occupant made against the Wielopolskis.

The military service brought no improvement in Zygmunt’s attitude towards life; what is more, his incorrect behaviour worsened. Archive entries show that the Count, being unused to drilling, avoided staying in the barracks. According to historians, during his service in the tsarist army, he did not distinguish himself in any way and it was only due to his father’s protection and social connections with the tsarist generals (I. Paskiewicz and S. Paniutyn) that he was promoted to lieutenant rank.⁶⁷ It was also owing to them that since 15 May 1854 he held the position of an orderly officer with the headquarters of the Second Corps⁶⁸ which was to be sent to Sevastopol (at that time the 1853-1856 Crimean War was fought).

⁶² Ibidem.

⁶³ The exam was not a difficult one since “the required knowledge had to cover the basis of the infantry and cavalry, distinguishing the books in French and German and simple calculations”; i.e. the knowledge which was part of Zygmunt’s education at home, grammar school and a military course. W. Caban, *Shuzba*, p. 40.

⁶⁴ APK, AOM, sig. 245a, p. 1.

⁶⁵ So it was in other cases. The tsarist general Władysław Wejtka noted: “Polish society which had not had its own army for more than 100 years saw in each man bearing a uniform a servant of the despotic power”. P. Stawecki, *Słownik Biograficzny Generalów Wojska Polskiego 1918-1939*, Warsaw 1994, p. 11.

⁶⁶ She tried to explain herself saying that “c’est une de ces tristes nécessités provenant de notre malheureuse position”. A. M. Skalkowski, *Aleksander*, vol. 2, p. 271.

⁶⁷ Z. Stankiewicz, *Dzieje*, pp. 45-57.

⁶⁸ APK, AOM, sig. 245, p. 48.

Thereby, all hopes that the son will become more sober have proven to be in vain. During the first months of military service Zygmunt followed the well trodden paths; he claimed to behave correctly so as to gain the trust of his parents and extort more and more funds. He implied in his letters that he spent his time off duty in the company of well-bred youth of the landed gentry circles from Lubelskie region. He reportedly made frequent visits to local manor houses and aristocratic residences, including the entailed estate of Zamoyski family. The truth came to light during the Carnival of 1854. Wielopolski Junior came to Warsaw with a group of like-minded officers, where he was looking for fun in gambling and in drinking sessions. Once again he got involved in passing affairs with actresses from the metropolitan theatres. His behaviour in public places caused that he returned to the spotlight of the Warsaw society salons. The Margrave was informed about it by his friends R. Załuski and P. Popiel, who could witness the excesses of Zygmunt themselves. The father tried to intervene, however futile that was. Limiting the salary paid out to Zygmunt did not help as he borrowed from his friends, which made Aleksander pay his uncontrollable debts.

All the observations that the Margrave made during his son's two-year military service convinced him that Zygmunt should resign his commissions. Military service did not bring any political benefits regarding Aleksander Wielopolski's political plans. The Count avoided the service hiding behind the argument of alleged health problems; as a consequence, there could not be any brilliant career in the Russian uniform for him.⁶⁹ St. Petersburg did not return to talks refraining from any political references and taking the Count's service as a typical manifestation of the aristocracy's quest for protecting their vested ancestral interests. The public was relentless, unequivocally condemning the Margrave. An accurate account of this by Andrzej Skalkowski is as follows: "it was the father that was found responsible for this move and not the youngster who fancied a uniform like he was used to get a Cossack horse or an actress".⁷⁰ As a result, Wielopolski's road to the top in the Russian state through a military service of his son in the tsarist army and thus the execution of the Margrave's plans to force a political agreement with the Tsar turned out to be an illusion.

The Margrave Aleksander's decision to withdraw from the scandalous event, which had been gradually taking shape, was facilitated by his son's being involved in the case of the last will and testament of a bibliophile (*notabene* the Margrave's friend), Konstanty Świdziński.⁷¹ An opportunity for this was provided by a fortunate

⁶⁹ Z. Stankiewicz, *Dzieje*, pp. 45-57.

⁷⁰ A. M. Skalkowski, *Aleksander*, vol. 3, p. 146.

⁷¹ Konstanty Świdziński (1790-1855), a bibliophile, Polish culture memorabilia collector since 1818. He held the office of marshal in the Opoczno diet in 1822 and then became a civil counsel of the Sandomierz Province. A member of the Polish diet (in 1826, 1828). A participant of the November Uprising; a commissioner in the Committee for Civil and Criminal Affairs in 1830. After its dissolution he left for Cracow (here he continued completing the collections that he left attended by P. Popiel) and (gathered a part of polonica – Polish historical materials – in the Poznan province, under the care of Count Edward Raczyński). In 1833, after the amnesty he returned to the Kingdom and went further on to Ukraine. He bequeathed all his collections and domains to the Myszkowski family entail which, given the objections on the part of his relatives

coincidence that since the summer of 1854 Zygmunt's regiment stationed in Kiev (where the terminally ill collector and a close friend of Aleksander Wielopolski lived), from which as it was bound to be transferred to the Crimean theatre of military operations.⁷² Within 1855 the Margrave tried to prove in the letters to his wife that Zygmunt had demonstrated appropriate behaviour, proudly representing the family in contacts with the tsarist officials. Moreover, he praised him for well-conducted negotiations on the will with K. Świdziński. He argued that in view of the fact that the collection could be taken over by the Zamoyski Entailers, the son should leave the army, however, he claimed that he didn't want to discourage Zygmunt and impose his opinion on him. Although the Count did not abandon the pleasures of life, he did not indulge in them ostentatiously any more. He avoided publicity and a questionable companionship of the coquettes from metropolitan theatres, though he did indulge himself in gambling in the company of aristocrats, wealthy landed gentry and bourgeois.⁷³

After Konstanty had died in December 1855, there was a series of lawsuits that for nearly five years entangled the Wielopolski family in the fight for the bequest from the deceased collector. In terms of publicity, the above case had an aggravating effect on the already damaged reputation of Entailers of Chroberz among the contemporary Poles.⁷⁴ In February 1856, having heard the news of the preliminaries of peace ending the Crimean War, Zygmunt declared to leave the army after the official end of the conflict. He didn't want his opponents to accuse him of cowardice and avoiding service on the battlefield. He finally resigned from military service in April 1857.⁷⁵ Within the next four years the Margrave was introducing his son in his political activities, and finally, in 1861, he let him participate in his project to establish talks with the tsarist regime on the reconstruction of a partial autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland.⁷⁶

and the national public opinion, led to a long-lasting court suit with the Wielopolski family. A. Grygiel, *Muzeum Polskie im. Świdzińskich. Dzieje Kolekcji Konstantego Świdzińskiego: Sulgustów-Pińczów-Chroberz-Warszawa*, [in:] *Pińczowskie spotkania historyczne*, iss. 2: *Wielkie rody i wybitne postacie w dziejach Pińczowa*, Pińczów 1998, pp. 21-22.

⁷² During that time Zygmunt had been holding the position of an adjutant to the Commander of the Second Corps since 26 March 1854 and since 27 May of that year he had been assigned as a liaison officer to the Chief Command of the Central Army. APK, AOM, sig. 245, pp. 48-56.

⁷³ *Ibidem*, pp. 390-411.

⁷⁴ Wielopolski was accused of an attempt to homestead the collection of Polonica and "to hide it in the province in his palace in Chroberz", when the siblings of Konstanty involved in litigation with him were intending to make the collection available to "the nation", establishing the Świdziński Museum and an institute publishing archives from the era of Old Polish language. These arguments were raised especially by the Warsaw newspapers, which reflects the aggressive hate campaign against the Wielopolski family. Finally, in view of a universal condemnation for "greed, lordly pride and litigiousness", in 1860, the Margrave entered into an agreement with them, withdrawing his claim to the bequest from K. Świdziński. More information on the course of the conflict can be found in: F. Pułaski, *Spory o bibliotekę i zapis Konstantego Świdzińskiego*, "Przegląd Historyczny", vol. 8, 1909, pp. 345-355.

⁷⁵ APK, AOM, sig. 232, pp. 434-466.

⁷⁶ A. Skałkowski, *Aleksander*, vol. 3, p. 146.

To summarize the previous discussion, it is worth to point out a few issues. First of all, political activity of Aleksander Wielopolski, associated with the unpopular policy of Polish-Russian agreement, built his negative political image. His plans to restore at least some elements of a former self-government of the 1815-1830 Kingdom of Poland was forced in defiance of the opinion of the elites and broad masses. The Margrave's fellow countrymen did not want to see in his arguments convincing evidence for the legitimacy of a compromise with the partitioning power. His comments on maintaining national identity under foreign occupation and on providing conditions for the Polish national ownership were rejected en masse. The more so since in the 1850s and 1860s Aleksander Wielopolski pursued activities which were not in unison with the feelings of the public at large. As such were considered the authorship of the capitulating *Letter of a Polish nobleman...*, his frequent visits to the governor I. Paskiewicz, liaising with the tsarist bureaucracy and finally the case of his son's voluntary service in the Russian army.

Views and actions of the Margrave were contrary to the idea of "defence of national dignity", which was generally identified with the informal leader of the landed gentry in the Kingdom of Poland, Count Andrzej Zamoyski. It must be remembered that the Margrave unsuccessfully usurped this position – as was to be shown by the events of 1859-1863 – trying to take over this role from Count Zamoyski. The then prescribed rules included delimiting contacts with the partitioning power or avoiding scandalous gestures showing dependence on the tsarist state. Another element was the struggle to maintain the Polish ownership and defend the cultural identity of a captive nation. Count Andrzej, as he admitted himself, in order to maintain his leading position among the landowning elite, and to have some leeway in the face of the foreign regime did not accept any functions in the administration of the Kingdom of Poland. According to his political vision, the country was to be united by a personal union with Russia; a relative independence from St. Petersburg was to be based on international guarantees, i.e. the decisions of the Congress of Vienna. Tsarist concessions were to be one-sided, without any commitment on the Polish side. It can be seen that this concept was not an agreement in the strict sense of the word; the Kingdom of Poland would be connected with the partitioning state only through a passive loyalty, forced acceptance of the current *status quo*.⁷⁷

The above factors were not a good prognostic for the Margrave who was finally brought to power in the Kingdom of Poland in years 1861-1862 following a combination of events.⁷⁸ His attitude and the program he promoted generated reluctance,

⁷⁷ Z. Stankiewicz, *Ziemiaństwo wobec systemu Wielopolskiego*, [in:] *Powstanie styczniowe 1863-1864. Wrzenie. Bój. Europa. Wizje*, ed. S. Kalembka, Warsaw 1990, p. 101.

⁷⁸ This case was not so easily forgotten as it was still reproached to the Margrave by general Władysław Zamoyski in 1862. According to one report, the general would have said: "you miss Russia so much for you put all your hopes in it and even clad your son in a Russian uniform". Wielopolski answered with pride: "I can not see in this either transgression or treason of the fatherland. I had such a conviction and I judged it right. Anyway, I do not give anyone the right to decide about my home and family matters". A. Żor, *Ropucha*, p. 124; M. W. Berg,

as was shown for example by Władysław Mickiewicz. The latter described Aleksander Wielopolski as “the leader of the party which was called doctrinaire in France as it consisted of people eager to use the words »freedom« and »progress«, and at the same time hating both of these things”.⁷⁹ Such a negative public reaction to the activities carried out by the Margrave resulted from dogmatism and nepotism attributed to him, whereas “his pushing up his son [...] and, finally, the use of Zygmunt’s uniform for tipping the scales of victory in the court suit on Świdziński’s bequest was evidence that the Margrave was thinking about renewing the brilliance of his family. While craving for a career for his son, he did not part with a plan for his own promotion to a statesman”.⁸⁰

Resume

LA CONTROVERSE SUR L’OPINION PUBLIQUE DU ROYAUME DE POLOGNE AUTOUR DU SERVICE VOLONTAIRE DE ZYGMUNT WIELOPOLSKI DANS L’ARMEE RUSSE (1849-1855)

L’article décrit le problème de controverse dans l’opinion publique du Royaume de Pologne invoqué le cas du service militaire volontaire, Zygmunt Wielopolski dans l’armée russe dans les années 1850-1857. Les polonais qu’ils attribuent au père d’un ancien plans politiques, par le biais de cette démonstration, de parler avec les autorités russes, sur la restauration de l’autonomie du Royaume, a reçu après l’insurrection de 1830-1831. L’article a montré que les calculs d’Alexander Wielopolski n’a pas produit de résultats. Carat n’est pas n’établi avec lui aucun dialogue; service militaire dépeignant les machinations de fils par les pôles de la trahison d’une certaine nation, en raison de ceux qui servent dans les rangs de l’armée de la période coloniale. Le cas ci-dessus a été décider de la condamnation et le rejet de la notion de règlement par les polonais dans les années 1861-1863.

Cle de mot: noblesse, Royaume de Pologne, XIX siècle

Keywords: nobility, Congress Poland, 19th century

Streszczenie

KONTROWERSJE OPINII PUBLICZNEJ KRÓLESTWA POLSKIEGO WOKÓŁ OCHOTNICZEJ SŁUŻBY ZYGMUNTA WIELOPOLSKIEGO W ARMII CARSKIEJ (1849-1855)

Artykuł opisuje problem kontrowersji, jakie w opinii publicznej Królestwa Polskiego wywołała sprawa ochotniczej służby wojskowej Zygmunta Wielopolskiego w armii

Zapiski o powstaniu polskim 1863 i 1864 r. i poprzedzających powstanie epoce demonstracji do 1856 r., transl. K. Jaskłowski, vol. 1, Chotomów 1991, p. 215.

⁷⁹ W. Mickiewicz, *Pamiętniki*, v. 2 1862-1863, Kraków 1927, p. 165.

⁸⁰ Z. Stankiewicz, *Dzieje*, p. 91.

rosyjskiej w latach 1850-1857. Polacy przypisywali, iż celem ojca hrabiego były plany polityczne, poprzez tę demonstrację, podjęcie rozmów z władzami rosyjskimi, na temat przywrócenia autonomii Królestwu, odebranego po upadku powstania 1830-1831. Artykuł wykazał, iż te kalkulacje Aleksandra Wielopolskiego nie przyniosły żadnych wyników. Carat nie nawiązał z nim żadnego dialogu; służba wojskowa syna skompromitowała Wielopolskich, oskarżanych przez Polaków o zdradę narodową, ze względu na kompromitującą służbę w szeregach armii zaborczej. Powyższa sprawa miała zdecydować o potępieniu społecznym i odrzuceniu koncepcji ugody przez Polaków w latach 1861-1863.

Słowa kluczowe: szlachta, Królestwo Polskie, XIX w.

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